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INTRODUCTION

In Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety,' the Minnesota Supreme
Court construed article 1, section 6, of the Minnesota Constitution
as conferring a more expansive right to counsel than its federal
counterpart. Holding that a person suspected of driving while intoxicated has a limited right to consult an attorney before deciding
whether to submit to chemical testing, the court invalidated the implied consent statute 2 to the extent that it denies the accused this
right.3
Subsequently, in State v. Russell,4 the supreme court construed the
state constitutional guarantee of equal protection as conferring
broader protections than the federal guarantee. 5 By invoking a less
deferential standard of review than required by federal law, the court
invalidated a state statute 6 imposing harsher penalties for possession
of "crack" cocaine than powder cocaine.7
The Friedman and Russell decisions are the most recent in a series
of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions construing the state constitution as conveying broader protections than the federal Constitution.8
Since 1987, the Minnesota Supreme Court has construed the state
constitution as bestowing broader protections than the federal Constitution in the areas of religion,9 jury trials,O privacy,' 1 right to
counsel,12 and equal protection.13 It is evident that these decisions
represent only the shadow of what is to come on the constitutional
horizon as the court has unequivocally demonstrated its willingness
to rely on the state constitution as an alternative avenue for relief.t4
1. 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
2. MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (1990).
3. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833-34.
4. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
5. Id. at 888.
6. MINN. STAT. § 152.023, subd. 2 (1990).
7. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888.
8. See infra part III.
9. See State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
10. See State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988).
11. SeeJarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
12. See Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn.
1991).
13. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
14. See State v. Berge, 464 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. Ct. App.) (holding that state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not require suppression of evidence of refusal to submit to alcohol testing), afd, 474 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991);
Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 471 N.W.2d 372 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that application of state Labor Relations Act to school violated state constitutional guarantee of religious protection), rev'd, 487 N.W.2d 857
(Minn. 1992).
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These decisions are dramatically redefining the scope of Minnesotans' constitutional rights as the supreme court undertakes to
develop an independent body of state constitutional law. As the
highest authority on issues of state law, the Minnesota Supreme
Court need only articulate that its decision rests on adequate and
independent state grounds to insulate the decision from federal review.15 While the goal of establishing an independent body of state
constitutional law is laudable and has been hailed as fundamental to
the protection of individual liberties in a federalist system,16 the Minnesota Supreme Court's recent decisions fail to provide textual or
historical evidence demonstrating that the decisions are truly
grounded in the state constitution.
State constitutional adjudication that lacks a cogent methodology
for analyzing state constitutional claims has been criticized as "constitution-shopping" or "result-oriented adjudication" in which the
court invokes the state constitution to achieve a result not readily
available elsewhere. It has been argued that this has the effect of
reallocating power from the legislature to the judiciary. Moreover,
the absence of a cogent methodology makes it difficult for counsel to
predict the future course of state constitutional law.
On the other hand, supporters of a more active approach to the
state constitution have countered that implementing a methodology
to determine when the court may expansively interpret the state constitution would unnecessarily inhibit the court in developing an independent and vital body of state constitutional law. They contend
that restrictions imposed upon the method of state constitutional adjudication ultimately detracts from the free exercise of the state's
sovereign power, which is at the very core of our federalist system.
Moreover, they argue that imposing interpretive criteria would create an unwarranted presumption in favor of the validity of federal
law.
This Note examines criticism of the activist approach in the context of recent Minnesota constitutional decisions. Part II presents a
brief overview of the state judiciary's power to construe its constitution more expansively than the federal Constitution and the nationwide exercise of this power which has come to the forefront in recent
years. Parts II and III present an overview of Minnesota constitutional developments. Part IV analyzes the Friedman and Russell decisions in light of their divergence from federal law and considers the
strength of the state constitutional claims. Part V evaluates the criticism, presents an alternative approach to state constitutional adjudication implemented by other jurisdictions, and applies the
15. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
16. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual

Rights, 90 HARV. L.

REV.

489 (1977).
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alternative approach to the Friedman and Russell decisions. This Note
argues that the alternative approach is the sounder judicial approach
toward the development of an independent body of state constitutional law.
II.

OVERVIEW OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

The Power of a State to Construe its Constitution More Expansively
than the Federal Constitution
Although a state court may not restrict individual liberties beyond
the threshold of protections articulated by federal law,17 state courts
have always retained the power to construe their constitutions so as
to confer broader protections than the federal Constitution.18 This
power flows from a federalist structure of government that envisions
independent layers of federal and state protections whereby one entity may safeguard rights not protected by the other. As James
Madison recognized, this structure creates a "double security [that]
arises to the rights of the people."' 9
The federal judiciary has long respected the role of the state judiciary as final arbiter on issues of state law. 20 This respect is reflected
by various obstacles to the exercise of federal jurisdiction.21 To insulate a state constitutional decision from federal review, the state
court need only articulate that its decision is based on adequate and
independent state grounds. 22 If the decision is intertwined with federal Constitutional law, the court must articulate that it cites federal
law merely for guidance and not as binding authority.23
In most instances, the reach of federal jurisdiction has not been

A.

17. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
18. Id.; see also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).

19. Madison theorized that:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people
is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence
a double security arises to the rights of the people.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
20. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874) (holding that repeal of a proviso
of the judiciary Act of 1789 limiting Supreme Court review of state decisions to federal questions did not confer jurisdiction to decide questions of state law).
21. In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945), the Court recognized the limits to
its jurisdiction as grounded in the Article III prohibition against rendering advisory
opinions. The court held:
Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that
they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. . . . We are not permitted to render
an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the
state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.
Id. at 125-26.
22. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
23. Id. at 1040-41.
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problematic for state courts resorting to their constitutions.24 The

discovery of the state constitution as an alternative source for protecting individual liberties has produced striking results nationwide
as state courts turn to their constitutions with increasing frequency.
In what has been coined "the new federalism,"25 state judiciaries
across the nation have undertaken to develop independent bodies of
state constitutional law.
B.

The Nationwide Exercise of Power

Historically, the state constitution was the mainstay for protecting
individual liberties. Many state constitutions predated the federal
Constitution, and the debates of the federal constitutional convention reflect no intent that the state bill of rights be dependent upon
the federal bill of rights.26 Moreover, until the federal bill of rights

was extended to the states through the process of selective incorporation, these protections existed only as a check on the exercise of
federal power. 2 7 Accordingly, the state constitution offered the only
protection available against arbitrary state action.
Despite the historical role of the state constitution as primary protector of individual liberties, the document has, in modern jurisprudence, remained largely ignored.28 Before the expansion of
individual protections under the Warren Court, few states invoked
their constitutions to bestow broader protections than federal law
required. Under the Warren court, the federal Constitution was
used to establish a floor of minimum protections, and many states
24. In many situations when the state court has been reversed by the United
States Supreme Court, the state court has reinstated its original decision by invoking
the state constitution as an independent ground. See e.g., State v. Chrisman, 619 P.2d
971 (Wash. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 1 (1982), on remand, 676 P.2d 419 (Wash. 1984)
(plain view doctrine); State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975), rev'd, 428
U.S. 364 (1976), on remand, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (inventory search); People v.
P.J. Video, 483 N.E.2d 1120 (N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 868 (1986), on remand, 501
N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1986) (probable cause to support warrant); see also William W.
Greenhalgh, Independent and Adequate State Grounds: The Long and Short of It, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 211 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., West 1985) (discussing state constitutional adjudication in context of Long doctrine).
25. See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
26. See Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491,
496-97 (1984).
27. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.2, at 332
(4th ed. 1991).
28. Commentators have cited the dominance of federal constitutional analysis as
the primary reason for the diminished role of the state constitution. See, e.g., Robert
F. Williams, In The Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court's
Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 352 (1984).
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only reluctantly complied with the federal threshold.29 As the federal tide shifted toward judicial conservativism, the state judiciary
was in a quandary. Confounded by the federal course of events, the
state judiciary was presented with the choice of restricting constitistional doctrine in accordance with federal doctrine or reviving the
state constitution to maintain or amplify these protections.3 0 Many
courts chose the latter course.
In response to the increasing conservatism of the United States
Supreme Court,3 ' state constitutional litigation has reached a level
unprecedented in modern jurisprudence. Almost every state has
turned to its constitution to maintain or expand the scope of individual protections. Many state courts have invoked the state constitution to reinstate a decision that was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court.32 In this respect, the state effectively has the power
to reverse the United States Supreme Court within the Court's juris29. Justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court has colorfully
commented:
Before Warren, state courts were guilty of a dismal performance in enforcing provisions of their own constitutions. At the same time, the United
States Supreme Court tolerated an era that was characterized by a benign
acceptance of racism, political rotten boroughs, disability of the poor, an
Anthony Comstock approach to sexual matters, denial of universal suffrage,
egregious imposition on the rights of the criminally accused. Under Chief
Justice Warren and his merry men, the court abandoned an apathetic approach to overt injustice in society and elected to employ the federal constitution to achieve a liberating and egalitarian impact in the areas of political
opportunity, criminal justice, and racial equality. The states were compelled
to fall in line, some of them were dragged kicking and screaming. Despite
the furor over many of the decisions, notably in the areas of reapportionment and protection of the rights of criminal defendants, state courts swallowed their provincial prejudices and obediently embarked on the
designated new course. The nation and the states truly experienced a legal
revolution.
Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism after Warren: Avoiding the Potamic's Ebb and Flow, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 24, at 201.

30. Justice Mosk further comments:
When the Supreme Court careens from one side of the constitutional spectrum to the other, state courts have two alternatives. They can shift gears
and once again change directions, thus resuming the course upon which
they were originally embarked pre-Warren. Or they can retain existing individual rights by reliance on the independent nonfederal grounds found in
the several state constitutions.

Id. at 203.
31. See Brennan, supra note 16, at 493-95.
32. See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 619 P.2d 971, 975 (Wash. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 1
(1982), where the Washington Supreme Court held that a campus police officer's
warrantless entry and search of a college dormitory room violated the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court's decision was reversed and remanded, the United States Supreme Court characterizing the state's holding as a
"novel reading" of the Fourth Amendment. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 6. On remand, the

Washington Supreme Court reinstated its original decision by stating that the deci-
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dictional boundaries. Criminal protections, most notably search and
seizure, continue to be the most fertile areas for state constitutional
challenges.33 However, many other rights have been successfully invoked under the state constitution, most visibly in areas of privacy,34
speech, 3 5 and equal protection.36
III.

EARLY MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly professed its power
to interpret the state constitution more expansively than the federal

document.37 But until fairly recently, it has stopped short of asserting this power.38 Although members of the court acknowledged the
power of the state judiciary to confer heightened protections under
the state constitution as early as 1974,39 there was tension within the
court over whether to interpret state rights beyond federal Constitusion was based "solely and exclusively" on the state constitution. State v. Chrisman,
676 P.2d 419 (Wash. 1984).
33. See Barry Latzer, Into the 90's: More Evidence that the Revolution has a Conservative
Underbelly, 4 EMERGING ISSUES STATE CONST. L. 17 (1991).

34. Some states have explicitly recognized the right to abortion under the state
constitution. See Doe v. Director of Dep't of Social Services, 468 N.W.2d 862, 875
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that statute prohibiting Department of Social Services
from paying for abortion impinges upon fundamental right under state constitution),
rev'd, 439 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1992); Planned Parenthood League v. Operation Rescue, No. CIV.A.89-2487-F, 1991 WL 214047, (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1991) (holding that right to abortion is a substantive right guaranteed by both federal and state
constitutions). In addition, many states have recognized an elevated right to privacy
under the state constitution. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989); State
v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 1988); State v. Vanderlinder, 575 So.2d 521, 523
(La. 1991); State v. Griffith, 808 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Wash. 1991); see also Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 215.

35. See People v. Diguida, 576 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
state constitution's speech and press provisions may be interpreted more expansively
than federal counterpart), rev'd, 1992 WL 246027, - N.E.2d - (Ill. 1992); Acara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986) (holding, after reversal by United
States Supreme Court on federal constitutional grounds, Acara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,
478 U.S. 697 (1986), that state constitutional freedom of expression provision prevents closing of adult bookstore).
36. See State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991) (holding that state
equal protection clause confers greater protection than federal clause); State v.
Brayman, 751 P.2d 294, 303 (Wash. 1988) (same).
37. See, e.g., State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844
(Minn. 1985); O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979).
38. See State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985) (recognizing power to interpret the double jeopardy provision more expansively than the federal provision but
declining to do so); State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987) (recognizing that
state constitution confers a right to privacy but declining to find a protectable privacy
interest in commercial sexual activity).
39. See State v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 414, 216 N.W.2d 641, 649-50 (Minn.
1974) (Otis, J., concurring) (arguing that court abdicated its responsibility in failing
to evaluate obscenity ordinance under the state constitution).
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For many years the court proceeded with

caution.41

It was not until roughly 1985 that the Minnesota Supreme Court
focused its attention on the state constitution.42 Since 1985, the
court has interpreted Minnesota's constitution as conveying broader
protections than the federal Constitution in the areas of search and
seizure,43 jury trials,44 religion,45 privacy,46 due process, 4 7 right to
counsel,48 and most recently, equal protection.49 The court has expressed its willingness to consider the state constitution on issues of
40. In State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1986), the court held that the

legislative scheme imposing vicarious criminal liability upon an employee whose employer served liquor to a minor violated both state and federal due process. Id. at
345. To insulate the decision from federal review, the court articulated that its holding was based exclusively on the state constitution. Id. at 349. A vigorous dissent by
Justice Kelley argued that the majority was overriding strong Minnesota policy and
over 80 years of legislative intent by holding the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 34950.
This tension was also apparent in State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985).
In Fuller, the majority acknowledged its power to extend the double jeopardy doctrine by using the state constitution but declined to do so. Justice Wahl filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the court should not be inhibited from exercising its
responsibility to apply the independent protection of the state constitution. Id. at
727 (Wahl, J., dissenting) (citing Brennan, supra note 16, at 491).
41. Beginning in 1985, the court considered but rejected most arguments to expand the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987)
(holding that although state constitution affords right to privacy, it does not encompass the right to engage in acts of sodomy for compensation); State v. Fuller, 374
N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985) (reversing appellate court's finding that state double jeopardy clause bars retrial of defendant when prosecutor elicited inadmissible evidence
from defendant concerning his prior record); State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health
Club, 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985) (declining to strike down Human Rights Act as
violative of state freedom of religion clause).
This atmosphere of caution was reflected by Justice Peterson in Fuller when he
stated, "State courts are, and should be, the first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist system. This, of course, does not mean that we will or
should cavalierly construe our constitution more expansively than the United States
Supreme Court has construed the federal constitution". Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 72627 (footnote omitted).
42. See O'Connor v.Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979) (holding that art. I,
§ 10, of the state constitution prevents the search of the office of an attorney who is
not suspected of criminal wrongdoing where no threat exists that documents sought
will be destroyed).
43. Id.
44. State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988).
45. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); State ex rel. Cooper
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
46. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
47. State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1986).
48. Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
49. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
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obscenity,50 self-incrimination,5l and the establishment clause.52
Although recent challenges invoking the state constitution have resulted in expansive treatment of various provisions, the persistence
of forceful dissenting opinions indicates that there is still a considerable degree of tension within the court over how to interpret the
Minnesota constitution.53 The following sections delineate the most

visible developments in Minnesota constitutional law.
A.

Religion

The textual disparity between the state freedom of religion provision and the federal free exercise provision54 makes the state provi50. State v. Davidson, 471 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 481 N.W.2d
51 (Minn. 1992).
51. State v. Berge, 464 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that state
constitutional protection against self-incrimination does not preclude admission of
evidence of refusal to submit to chemical testing under implied consent statute), aftd,
474 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
52. Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 471 N.W.2d 372
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that application of state Labor Relations Act to
school violates religious protection clause of state constitution), rev'd, 487 N.W.2d
857 (Minn. 1992).
53. Most opinions construing state constitutional provisions more expansively
have been written by Justice Yetka. See State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2
(Minn. 1990) (holding that state constitutional freedom of religion provision protects
landlord's right to exclude cohabitating tenants); State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379
(Minn. 1988) (holding that statute providing for six-person jury in misdemeanor and
gross misdemeanor cases violates state constitutional right to jury); Jarvis v. Levine,
418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988) (holding that state constitutional right to privacy requires judicial approval prior to forcible administration of medication to physiatric
patients); State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1986) (holding that statute imposing vicarious criminal liability for state liquor violations violates due process
clause of state constitution). Justice Wahl has also authored several opinions construing the state constitution expansively. See also State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886
(Minn. 1991) (holding that statute imposing disparate penalties for possession of
"crack" cocaine than powder cocaine which results in disparate racial impact violates
state guarantee of equal protection); O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn.
1979) (holding that art. I, § 10, of state constitution prevents the search of attorney's
office who is not suspected of criminal wrongdoing where there is no threat that
documents sought will be destroyed).
However, Justice Coyne has expressed her dissatisfaction with the majority's reasoning in several strenuous dissenting opinions. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d
886, 895-903 (Minn. 1991) (Coyne, J., dissenting); Friedman v. Commissioner of
Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 838-47 (Minn. 1991) (Coyne,J., dissenting). These
decisions suggest that the court is polarized, with Justices Yetka and Wahl advocating
a more active use of the document and Justice Coyne advocating greater judicial restraint when invoking the state constitution to invalidate a statute.
54. The federal provision provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
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sion especially susceptible to expansive treatment. Earlier decisions
invoking the religious protection clause employed a federal analysis,
giving only cursory mention to the state constitution. For example,
in State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club,55 the Minnesota
Supreme Court employed a federal analysis to uphold the constitutionality of the Minnesota Human Rights Act56 against a free exercise challenge.57 The court reasoned that the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace was a compelling governmental interest that justified some abridgement of the right to religious freedom.58 A dissenting opinion by Justice Peterson argued that the

court had failed to give adequate consideration to the force of the
state constitutional claim.59
Recent Minnesota decisions have embraced the state freedom of
religion provision holding that "it grants far more protection of religious freedom than the broad language of the United States Constitution".60 In State ex rel. Cooper v. French,6 1 the Minnesota Supreme
Court reasoned that an independent consideration of the state constitutional claim was necessary "[iun light of the unforeseeable
changes ...

of the United States Supreme Court".6 2 The French case

involved a free exercise challenge brought by a landlord who had
been assessed civil penalties under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
for refusing to rent to an unmarried couple that intended to cohabiU.S. CONST. amend. I. The Minnesota provision provides:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience shall never be infringed, nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any religious or
ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be
given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship.
MINN. CONST.

art. 1, § 16.

Moreover, the preamble of the Minnesota Constitution also suggests the
strength of the guarantee to religious freedom:

We, the people of the State of Minnesota, grateful to God for our civil and
religious liberty, and desiring to perpetuate its blessings and secure the
same to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution:
MINN. CONST. pmbl.
55. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).
56. MINN. STAT. § 363.01 et seq. (1990).
57. McClure, 370 N.W.2d at 851-53.
58. Id. at 853. In McClure, the Commissioner of Human Rights sought to enjoin
the owners of a Health Club from questioning prospective employees about marital
status and religion, terminating employees due to differences in religious beliefs, and
refusing to promote employees due to differences in religious beliefs. Id. at 846.
The owners of the club challenged the Human Rights Act as violative of both state
and federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion. Id. at 852-53.
59. Id. at 873-75 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
60. State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 8.
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tate. 63 The court held the assessment violative of the landlord's state
constitutional right to religious freedom.64 By invoking the state
constitution, the court was able to make a complete shift away from
McClure to hold that the state guarantee of religious freedom superseded the interest of the state in eliminating discrimination.
The court took a similar approach in State v. Hershberger.6 5 After an
earlier decision was summarily vacated and remanded by the United
States Supreme Court,6 6 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
state statute requiring Amish citizens to display a slow-moving vehicle emblem on their horse-drawn carriages was violative of the state
guarantee of religious freedom.67 The court reasoned that although
public safety was a compelling state interest, a less discriminatory
alternative was available.68
By invoking the state constitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has extended broader religious protection to state citizens than required by federal law, which does not require religious exemptions
from facially neutral statutes of general applicability.69 French and
Hershbergerstrongly suggest that freedom of religion challenges predicated upon the state constitution will succeed.
B.

Criminal Protections

In O'Connorv. Johnson,70 the Minnesota Supreme Court invoked article I, section 10 of the state constitution to declare unreasonable a
warrant authorizing the search of an attorney's office. 7 1 The court
held that a subpeona duces tecum was required to search an attorney's office where the attorney was not suspected of criminal wrongdoing and where there was no risk that the attorney would destroy
evidence.72 Reasoning that the weight of federal authority was unclear, 73 the court turned to the state constitution as an independent
63. Id. at 3.
64.
65.
66.
(1990),
67.

Id. at 9.
State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
See State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn 1989), rev'd, 495 U.S. 901
on remand, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
See Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 399.

68. Id.
69. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that state statute
prohibiting sacramental use of peyote does not violate free exercise clause of federal
constitution).
70. 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979).
71. Id. at 405.
72. Id.
73. The United States Supreme Court, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 463 U.S. 547
(1978), held that a subpeona duces tecum was not constitutionally required to search
the premises of a third party. The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished the case
on grounds that in Zurcher, the third party had threatened to destroy the documents.
O'Connor, 287 N.W.2d at 405.
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ground for the decision. 74 In State v. Hamm, 75 the court construed

article I, section 6 of the state constitution as requiring twelve-person juries in misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor prosecutions. 76
Arguing that federal law delineating the scope of the right 7 7 had little relevance under an independent state constitutional analysis, the
court invalidated a state statute reducing the number of jurors in
non-felony cases from twelve to six. 78

The court cited three factors that supported divergence from the
federal standard. First, the court believed that the framers intended
a twelve-person jury when drafting the provision. 79 Second, this
number was reinforced by judicial decisions fixing the number at
twelve as early as 1869.80 Finally, early legislative history revealed
resort to the formal amendment process to revise the unanimity requirement, indicating that the legislature feared revising the right
through other means was unconstitutional. 8 1 Based on these factors,
the court construed the state provision as granting greater protection than its federal counterpart.
C. Privacy
In State v. Gray,8 2 the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized a right
to privacy under the state constitution.83 The court acknowledged
that it was neither bound by federal precedent in the classification of
fundamental rights nor limited in scope to those rights expressly
enumerated in the state constitution.8 4 However, the court declined
to find a protectable privacy interest in homosexual prostitution,
74. Id.
75. 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988).
76. Id. at 382.
77. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (holding that the federal
constitution does not require a state to provide 12-person juries in certain non-capital criminal offenses).
78. The statute provided:
Notwithstanding any law or rule of court to the contrary, a petit jury is a
body of six persons impaneled and sworn in any court to try and determine,
by a true and unanimous verdict, any question or issue of fact in a civil or
criminal action or proceeding, according to law and the evidence as given
them by the court.
MINN. STAT. § 593.01, subd. 1 (1986) (repealed 1990).
79. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 382.
80. Id. (citing State v. Everett, 14 Minn. 439 (1869)).
81. In 1890, the state constitution was amended to authorize the legislature to
permit verdicts agreed upon by only five-sixths of the jury in civil actions. See 1891
Minn. Laws 17. The court reasoned that amendment of the constitution was perceived as necessary to allow the legislature to tamper with jury requirements. Hamm,
423 N.W.2d at 381.
82. 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
83. Id. at 111.
84. Id.
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noting that its public nature was a factor weighing against its classification as a fundamental right. 85
In the subsequent decision ofJarvis v. Levine, 86 the supreme court
further refined the state constitutional right to privacy. In Levine, the
court held that the forcible administration of drugs to an involuntarily committed patient without prior judicial approval violated the
state constitutional right to privacy.87 The court concluded that an
expansive interpretation of the right to privacy under the state constitution was supported by judicial decisions affirming the protection
of bodily integrity.88
Most recently, in State v. Davidson, the Minnesota Supreme Court
declined to invalidate an obscenity law on the basis of the state right
to privacy.89 In Davidson, Minnesota's obscenity statute 90 was challenged on state and federal Constitutional grounds of privacy, overbreadth, vagueness, and freedom of speech.91 Although the court
commented that "the privacy guaranteed under article I, sections 1,
2, and 10, is broader than the privacy right read into the comparable
federal constitutional provision, 9 2 the court reaffirmed that the state
right to privacy does not extend to transactions in sexual
commerce. 9 3
85. Id. at 114. The Minnesota Supreme Court specifically limited its holding to
commercial sexual conduct. Id. Note that controlling federal precedent does not

extend privacy protections to consensual homosexual activity. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
86. 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
87. Id. at 150. Federal law held that in certain circumstances, a patient's rights
are adequately protected by the professional judgment of the treating physician, and
that these judgments are entitled to a presumption of validity. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
88. The court stated, "Although judicial recognition of a constitutional right of
privacy in Minnesota may be relatively recent, the protection of bodily integrity has
been rooted firmly in our law for centuries." Id. at 148-49.
89. 481 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 1992).
90. MINN. STAT. § 617.241 (1990).
91. The text of the free speech provision provides, "The liberty of the press shall
remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write and publish their sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right." MINN. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 3. The court declined to construe the state constitutional guarantee of free speech
to encompass obscene material because the plain language of the provision permits
the state to hold citizens accountable for the abuse of the right. Davidson, 481
N.W.2d at 55.
92. Id. at 57.
93. Id. The Davidson and Gray decisions suggest that while the court is willing to
consider privacy challenges under the state constitution, it will not find a protectable
privacy interest in sexual commerce. See Davidson, 481 N.W.2d at 57; Gray, 413
N.W.2d at 113-14.
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RECENT MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Right to Counsel
1.

The Federal Right

The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
issue of whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches
prior to chemical testing of a person suspected of drunken driving. 94
However, under federal Sixth Amendment doctrine, a "critical
stage" triggering the right to counsel does not arise until formal adversarial proceedings are commenced against the accused. 95
In Kirby v. Illinois, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court
held that the right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings.96 This requirement is supported by
the text of the provision, which by its terms applies only to "criminal
prosecutions."9 7 Under most state statutory schemes, the process of
chemical testing is merely an investigatory stage which necessarily
precedes the decision to prosecute. As a result, a majority of states
have concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
attach prior to chemical testing.98
94. The Minnesota decision of Nyflot v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 369
N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1025 (1985), held on federal grounds
that the right to counsel did not attach since formal adversarial proceedings had not
yet commenced. Review by the United States Supreme Court was denied "for want
of substantial federal question." See Nyflot, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985).
95. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 1027 (1972).
96. The court stated:
The initiation ofjudicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism.
It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For
it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and
only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial
forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive
and procedural law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the 'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of
the Sixth amendment are applicable.
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90. The subsequent Supreme Court decision of Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), reinforced the Kirby decision by holding that the mere
possibility that the proceeding may have important consequences at trial is not
enough to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Moran, 475 U.S. at 432.
Accord United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (holding that prisoners in administrative segregation are not entitled to court-appointed counsel prior to initiation of formal adversarial proceedings).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
98. See Campbell v. Superior Court, 479 P.2d 685 (Ariz. 1971); State v. Vietor,
261 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1978); State v.Jones, 457 A.2d 1116 (Me. 1983); Homberg v.
54-A Judicial District Judge, 231 N.W.2d 543 (Mich. 1975); Spradling v. Deimeke,
528 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1975); State v. Petkus, 269 A.2d 123 (N.H. 1970) cert. denied,
402 U.S. 932 (1971); Seders v. Powell, 259 S.E.2d 544 (N.C. 1979); McNulty v.
Curry, 328 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio 1975); State v. Newton, 636 P.2d 393 (Or. 1981); Law
v. Danville, 187 S.E.2d 197 (Va. 1972).
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2.

The State Right

Before the Sixth Amendment was extended to the states through
the process of selective incorporation,99 the right to counsel was protected only by the Minnesota Constitution or by statutory provisions
delineating the scope of the right.l1o Early Minnesota decisions interpreting the scope of Sixth Amendment rights reveal a general
hostility toward right to counsel challenges.' 0 '
With the expansive treatment of criminal protections under the
Warren Court, the state judiciary was required to comply with a
threshold of sixth amendment protections established by federal law.
As a result, during this period, state constitutional analysis was essentially superseded by federal analysis. The right to counsel afforded by the Minnesota constitution was not invoked again by the
courts as an independent source of protection until the Friedman
decision.
The argument that chemical testing under the implied consent
statute 0 2 constitutes a critical stage was first advanced in State v.
99. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
100. See State v. Utecht, 233 Minn. 434, 47 N.W.2d 99 (1951) (noting that

MINN.

CONST. art. I, § 6, and MINN. STAT. § 630.10 are the only guarantees of the right to
counsel in state criminal prosecutions).
101. Thejudicial history prior to incorporation of the right reveals that there were
numerous Sixth Amendment challenges, only a handful of which were successful.
Those decisions finding violations usually consisted of quite egregious conduct on
the part of the state. See State v. Rigg, 251 Minn. 120, 86 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1957)
(holding that state right to counsel was violated when court-appointed counsel failed
to consult with accused before advising him to plead guilty); see also State v. Martineau, 257 Minn. 334, 101 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1960) (holding that state fight to counsel was violated when court-appointed attorney was required to represent two
defendants who were jointly charged, and attorney could make no decision of any
consequence without harming other defendant). This hostility is best illustrated by
State ex rel. Welper v. Rigg, 254 Minn. 10, 93 N.W.2d 198 (1958), in which the court
stated:
Our state constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel in his defense. This is
merely a declaration of the right, and it has been noted that there is nothing
in this section which requires a court to inform defendant of his right to
have an attorney or to appoint one for him where he is unable to hire one
for himself. Any such rights, if they are conferred at all, are conferred by
statute, and even then, not every denial thereof is a violation of the state or
federal due process clauses. Id. at 14, 93 N.W.2d at 201-02.
102. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b), provides, in pertinent part:
(b) At the time a test is requested, the person shall be informed:
(1) that Minnesota law requires the person to take a test to determine
if the person is under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance...
(2) that if testing is refused, the person may be subject to criminal
penalties, and the person's right to drive will be revoked for a minimum
period of one year or, if the person is under the age of 18 years, for a period
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Palmer.lOS In Palmer, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the argument that the right attaches at chemical testing on grounds that a
license revocation proceeding under the statute was civil and not
criminal.104 Five years later in Prideaux v. State Department of Public
Safety, the court held that the implied consent statute provided a limited right to consult an attorney prior to chemical testing.105 The
court avoided resting its decision on federal constitutional grounds,
choosing instead to construe the language of the statute as inconsistent with legislative intent.10 6 However, in dictum, the majority expressed its belief that chemical testing should be treated as a critical
stage. 10 7 In response to Prideaux, the legislature amended the statute
to allow a limited consultation with counsel prior to testing.10 8 However, in 1984 the legislature again amended the statute, expressly
denying the right to consult an attorney prior to testing.109 The
of one year or until the person reaches the age of 18 years, whichever is
greater...
(4) that after submitting to testing, the person has the right to consult
with an attorney and to have additional tests made by someone of the person's own choosing...
103. 291 Minn. 302, 191 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1971).
104. Id. at 306-07, 191 N.W.2d at 190-91. The classification of the proceeding as
civil obviates the need to address the question of whether a critical stage arises since,
by its terms, the Sixth Amendment applies only to "criminal prosecutions".
105. 310 Minn. 405, 420-21, 247 N.W.2d 385, 394 (1976).
106. At the time of decision, the statute did not expressly deny the right to counsel. The court held that since the statute recognized a right to consult an attorney
and others for the purpose of securing additional tests, there was no evidence that
the legislature intended to deny this right prior to chemical testing. Id. at 421, 247
N.W.2d at 394.
107. The court also argued that the proceeding was a critical stage under federal
law. As authority for this view, the court cited United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), for the view that chemical testing presented a stage in which the presence of
counsel was necessary to preserve the right to a fair trial. The court apparently did
not feel bound by the plurality opinion in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972),
which had held that even if the presence of counsel is fundamental to a fair trial, the
right to counsel does not attach until formal adversarial proceedings have begun.
108. See 1978 Minn. Laws 788, ch. 727, § 3.
109. The right to counsel amendment was one of several changes to the implied
consent statute devised to discourage persons from refusing the test. Senator
Pogemiller introduced an amendment to the statute which would make refusal to
submit to chemical testing a crime. The policy underlying the amendment was to
encourage persons suspected of drunken driving to submit to testing, thus making
prosecution easier. At the time of amendment, statistics indicated that approximately
one-third of persons suspected of drunken driving were refusing to submit to testing.
Statistics further indicated that approximately 60% to 70% of repeat offenders were
refusing. Thus, the statute was amended to require a person suspected of drunken
driving to submit to testing. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(l) (1990).
Interestingly, Senator Pogemiller's version of the bill allowed consultation with
an attorney prior to chemical testing. Senator Pogemiller believed that allowing con-
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newly amended statute was challenged on federal constitutional
grounds in Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety,

o1where the Minne-

sota Supreme Court declined to characterize the proceeding as a
critical stage since formal adversarial proceedings had not yet commenced."'I The Nyflot majority noted that although the decision of
whether to refuse testing under the implied consent statute was a
situation in which the advice of counsel may be useful, "there being
no right under the constitution to consult with counsel in this context, the decision whether or not to provide that right is one for the
legislature to make."' 12
3.

The Friedman Decision

The right-to-counsel controversy continued, and the implied consent statute was challenged again in Friedman v. Commissioner of Public
Safety.' 13 Joy Friedman was taken to the police station for an intox-

ilyzer test after she failed the preliminary test." 14 Friedman asked
what her rights were and whether she could consult an attorney." 1 5
The officer responded by reading her the implied consent advisory
which stated that refusal to submit to testing would result in revocation of her license for one year, that the refusal could be used as
evidence against her at trial, and that she could consult an attorney
after testing was completed.' 16 The advisory was read to Friedman
three times, after which she expressed confusion over why she was
required to submit to further testing.117 The trial court deemed

sultation with counsel would help neutralize an unpleasant situation for parties involved in testing. However, concern was expressed during the debates that
permitting consultation with an attorney would render consultation meaningless
since an attorney cannot ethically advise a client to violate the law. It was further
pointed out that persons accused of other crimes are not entitled to consult an attorney during the evidence-gathering stage.
Norm Coleman, Assistant Attorney General, testified that a statute that made
refusal a crime yet permitted a right to consult an attorney for the purpose of deciding whether to refuse was logically inconsistent. He argued that permitting a right to
counsel would not facilitate the goal of encouraging persons to submit to testing and
would send mixed signals to a person in such a situation. Mandatory Testing: Hearings
on S. 1336 Before the Judiciary Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Judiciary Comm., 73d Minn.

Leg., (Mar. 1 & 9, 1984).
110. 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985).
111. Id. at 515-16.
112. Id. at 517. Justice Yetka, whom Justice Wahl joined, filed a lengthy dissenting
opinion, characterizing the majority's holding a "grave intrusion on the dignity of the
individual" which "is more akin to the laws prevailing in totalitarian states." Id. at
521, 525.
113. 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
114. Id. at 829.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Friedman's behavior a refusal, and her license was revoked for one
8
year. "1
Friedman appealed the suspension, alleging that the statute violated her state constitutional right to counsel.' '9 The Court of Appeals declined to construe the state right to counsel more
expansively than the federal right, holding that Friedman had not
made an adequate showing that she was entitled to expansive treatment under the state constitution.120
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. Justice Yetka, writing for
the majority,12, began the majority analysis by espousing the importance of the right to counsel in general terms.1 22 The majority then
acknowledged its power to interpret the state constitution independently from the federal source, and noted the nationwide revival of
the state constitution. 123 The majority next turned to Minnesota history, arguing that "Minnesota has a long tradition of assuring the
right to counsel."t 24 As evidence of this tradition, the majority cited
Minnesota Statute section 481.10, which was enacted in 1887 and
requires the state to allow consultation with counsel to persons restrained of their liberty "as soon as practicable."125 The court then
turned to Minnesota case law, distinguishing Nyflot on the basis that
118. Id.
119. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 455 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990), rev'd, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
120. Then-Minnesota Appellate Court Judge Gardebring held that none of the
factors the Supreme Court had relied on in prior cases to expansively interpret the
state constitution were present, nor had Friedman demonstrated any other unique
factors that would dictate a higher standard of protection under the state constitution. Id. at 96.
121. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
Only three of seven justices joined in the majority opinion. NeitherJustice Simonett
nor Justice Gardebring took part in the decision; Justice Coyne and Justice Keith
dissented.
122. The majority opinion traced the English and American common law history
as support for its assertion that the right to counsel is firmly rooted in American
jurisprudence. Fiednan,473 N.W.2d at 829-30.
123. Id. at 830.
124. Id. at 831.
125. Id. at 832. The full text of the statute provides that:
All officers or persons having in their custody a person restrained of liberty
upon any charge or cause alleged, except in cases where imminent danger of
escape exists, shall admit any resident attorney retained by or on behalf of
the person restrained, or whom the restrained person may desire to consult,
to a private interview at the place of custody. Such custodians, upon request
of the person restrained, as soon as practicable, and before other proceedings shall be had, shall notify any attorney residing in the county of the request for a consultation with the attorney. Every officer or person who shall
violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, in
addition to the punishment prescribed therefor shall forfeit $100 to the person aggrieved, to be recovered in a civil action.
MINN. STAT.

§ 481.10 (1990).
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it was decided on federal and not state constitutional grounds.126
Citing a federal decision, the majority adopted a broad definition
of a "critical stage" as "those pretrial procedures that would impair
defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without
counsel."127 Under this definition, the limitation articulated by federal law that the right attaches only after formal adversarial proceedings have commenced128 was deemed irrelevant.1 29 The majority
concluded that although there exists great public concern over the
problem of drunken driving, such concern does not justify "cancelling out the protection offered by over 100 years of precedent in
Minnesota."130
A dissenting opinion by Justice Coyne, joined by Justice Keith,1s1
argued that the proper role of thejudiciary is to determine whether a
statute meets the minimum requirements of the state and federal
constitutions rather than to substitute its political judgment for that
of the legislature.132 The dissenters maintained that there was little
evidence in support of the majority's position that the result was
compelled by the state constitution and that the "members [of this
court do not] constitute a continuing constitutional convention with
a 'roving commission' to substitute its will for the will of the people
as expressed in the words of the state constitution."l13
B.

Equal Protection
1. The Federal Right

Under federal equal protection analysis, a statute which has a disparate impact on a protected class but is not facially discriminatory
does not trigger strict scrutiny absent proof of purposeful discrimi126. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 832.
127. Id. at 833 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)).
128. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972).
129. See Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 834.
130. Id. at 834.
131. Justice Keith wrote a separate opinion charging that "the majority discards a
workable, sensible, and bright line test for the attachment of the right to counsel
derived from a nearly identical clause of the federal Constitution." Id. at 847 (Keith,
CJ., dissenting).
132. Justice Coyne stated:
Had I been a member of the Minnesota legislature in 1984, it is quite possible that I would have voted against the law that today's majority holds violative of the Minnesota Constitution. My role, however, as a judge of the
Minnesota Supreme Court is not to decide whether the legislature's policy
would have been my legislative choice. It is not our opinion of the wisdom
of Minn. Stat. § 169.123 subd. 2(b)(4) (1990), which is at issue here; the
question is whether the statute rises to the minimum requirements of article
I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution ....
Id. at 838 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 845.
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nation.' 3 4 Thus, in Washington v. Davis,'3 5 the United States
Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia did not violate the
federal guarantee of equal protection by administering an intelligence test to police recruits that resulted in a racially disparate impact. I3 6 As the Court explained in its subsequent decision of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corporation, the fact that the
legislature is properly concerned with balancing numerous competing interests requires judicial deference absent a showing of invidious discriminatory purpose.137
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines impose a substantially higher
penalty for the possession of cocaine base than for equal amounts of
powder cocaine.138 In United States v. Watson, the Guidelines were
challenged on the basis of disparate racial impact.'39 Finding no intent to discriminate, the Fifth Circuit invoked a minimum rationality
standard.140 The court concluded that the rationale offered by the
legislature-that cocaine base is more addictive, more dangerous,
and can be sold in smaller quantities-was sufficient to withstand this
standard of review.141
134. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
135. Id. at 252.
136. Id. The court stated: "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule ... that racial classifications are to
be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations." Id. at 242 (citations omitted).
137. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977). In Arlington Heights, the Court articulated the process by which it searches for
discriminatory intent. The Court held that disparate racial impact, while not determinative by itself, may provide an important starting point in the analysis. Id. at 266.
If the disparate impact is so profound as to be inexplicable on grounds other than
racial discrimination, the statute violates equal protection. Id. However, the Court
noted that such impact is rare. Other sources for determining purposeful discrimination include the legislative history leading up to the enactment, the extraneous
events prior to the enactment, and the procedural and substantive departures from
the usual legislative process. Id. at 267-68.
138. The disparity in the federal guidelines is much more pronounced than in the
Minnesota statute. Under federal guidelines, possession of 1.5 kilograms of cocaine
base is treated as equal to the possession of 150 kilograms of powder cocaine. See
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4).
139. United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1992).
140. Id. at 897.
141. Id. The circuit court noted the Russell decision in passing, stating:
To our knowledge, the only court that has not dismissed this equal protection challenge to the difference in sentences for possession of cocaine base
and cocaine powder is the Minnesota Supreme Court. In State v. Russell, a
divided Minnesota Supreme Court held that a Minnesota state sentencing
provision which provided for higher penalties for possession of crack cocaine than for equal quantities of powder cocaine violated the equal protection clause of the Minnesota Constitution. The Russell court noted that the
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The State Right

Unlike the federal guarantee of equal protection, the state guarantee is not explicit in the text of the constitution but has been characterized as a "unenumerated right."142 The right is distilled from
various constitutional provisions, including the privileges and immunities clause,t4 3 the uniformity clause, 144 and the special legislation

clause. 145
State judicial history suggests an intent to treat the state guarantee
46
of equal protection coextensively with the federal guarantee.'
rational basis test applied under the Minnesota Constitution .

.

. is more

stringent than its federal counterpart ....
Id. at 898 n.5 (citations omitted).
142. "The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair
others retained by and inherent in the people." MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
143. "No member of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the
rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the
judgement of his peers." MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
144. "Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects .... " MINN. CoNsT.
art. X, § 1.
145.
In all cases when a general law can be made applicable, a special law shall
not be enacted except as provided in section 2. Whether a general law
could have been made applicable in any case shall be judicially determined
without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject. The legislature
shall pass no local or special law authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, vacating or maintaining of roads, highways, streets or alleys; remitting
fines, penalties or forfeitures; changing the names of persons, places, lakes
or rivers; authorizing the adoption or legitimization of children; changing
the law of descent or succession; conferring rights on minors; declaring any
named person of age; giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds, or
affecting the estates of minors or persons under disability; granting divorces; exempting property from taxation or regulating the rate of interest
on money; creating private corporations, or amending, renewing, or extending the charters thereof; granting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise
whatever or authorizing public taxation for a private purpose. The inhibitions of local or special laws in this section shall not prevent the passage of
general laws on any of the subjects enumerated.
MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
146. Many decisions have stated explicitly that, even though worded differently,
the standard of review under the state constitution requires the same level of scrutiny
as that required by the federal constitution. See In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d
767, 770 n.2 (Minn. 1986) ("the rational basis standard used in Minnesota equal
protection analysis is the same as the standard used in federal equal protection analysis"); AFSCME v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 570 n.12 (Minn. 1983) ("the prohibition against arbitrary legislative action embodied in the state equal protection clause,
Minn. Const. art. I, § 2, the state uniformity clause, Minn. Const. art. X, § 1, and the
state special legislation clause, Minn. Const. art. XII, § 1, are coextensive with those
afforded by the federal equal protection clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1"); Schumann v. Commissioner of Taxation, 253 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn. 1977) (holding that
MINN. STAT. art. 1, § 2, and art. 10, § 1, impose no greater restriction on legislative
power to establish classifications than the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution); Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 354, 147 N.W.2d
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Under the rational basis standard of review employed by federal
358, 363 (Minn. 1966) (holding that the standards of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment are the same as the standards of equality under MINN.
STAT. art. 1, § 2, and art. 4, §§ 33 & 34).
Decisions that did not explicitly state that the tests were coextensive have done
so implicitly by subjecting state constitutional challenges to the same level of scrutiny
employed by federal law. See, e.g., Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422, 425
(Minn. 1985) (holding that a statute passes state constitutional scrutiny if it has a
legitimate purpose and it is reasonable for the legislature to believe the classification
will promote that purpose). Under the federal test, the statute is sustained if the
court can find any conceivable set of facts to support the distinction. See Rio Vista
Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 335 N.W.2d 242, 246 (Minn. 1983).
Thus, for example, in Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1979),
although the court invoked the three-pronged standard, it held that the uniformity
clause of the state constitution was no more restrictive than the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal Constitution, thereby suggesting that although worded differently, the level of scrutiny was the same. Id. at 356 n.3.
The three-pronged rationality test invoked by Russell first appeared in its present
form in Loew v. Hagerle Bros., 266 Minn. 485, 33 N.W.2d 598 (1948). Loew involved
a constitutional challenge based on the prohibition against special legislation embodied in MINN. STAT. art. XII, § 1. The Leow court stated:
The constitutional prohibition against special legislation . . . does not prevent
the legislature, with whom the responsibility of classification primarily rests,
from dividing a subject into classes, and a classification made pursuant to a public purpose, which has a rational basis upon any conceivable state of the facts,
although the court does not perceive all the facts justifying the classification, will
be held proper if:
(a) The classification uniformly, without discrimination, applies to and
embraces all who are similarly situated with respect to conditions or wants
justifying appropriate legislation;
(b) The distinctions which separate those who are included within the
classification from those who are excluded are not manifestly arbitrary or
fanciful, but are genuine and substantial so as to provide a natural and reasonable basis in the necessity or circumstances of the members of the classification to justify different legislation adapted to their peculiar conditions
and needs; and
(c) If the classification is germane or relevant to the purpose of the
law, i.e. there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs
peculiar to the class and the remedy or regulations therefor which the law
purports to provide.
Id. at 488-89, 33 N.W.2d at 601 (citations omitted).
In Loew, the plaintiff challenged a special enactment which deprived him of disability benefits. Id. at 487, 33 N.W.2d at 600. The statute stated that all persons who
had been disabled 20 years prior to passage of the statute but whose weekly compensation payments terminated subsequent to July 1, 1939, but before January 1, 1940,
were deprived of payments from the special compensation fund. Given the specificity
of the statute, it was clear that the legislature was purposefully discriminating against
the plaintiff. Under the three-pronged test, the court struck down the classification
as arbitrary and fanciful. Id. at 490, 33 N.W.2d at 602. The three-pronged standard
appeared later. McGuire v. C & L Restaurant, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 1984)
(holding that statute limiting civil damages for seller of hard liquor, but not for seller
of 3.2 beer violated state guarantee of equal protection); Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1981) (distinction in dramshop statute requiring more
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courts, a statute will survive constitutional scrutiny if it has a legitimate purpose and the court finds that it was reasonable for the legislature to believe the classification would promote the intended
purpose. 14 7 However, in several decisions the Minnesota Supreme
Court has invoked a test worded with less deference than the rational
basis test imposed by federal law.148 More recent decisions, however, have returned to the earlier stance holding that the state equal
protection standard, though worded differently, entails no greater
scrutiny than the federal standard. 149
3.

The Russell Decision

In State v. Russell, 150 the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated a
state statute' 5 ' imposing a greater penalty for the possession of cocaine base than for possession of powder cocaine. The defendants,
five African American men charged under the statute with possession
of cocaine base, moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the
statute violated federal and state guarantees of equal protection.152
The defendants conceded that the statute was not facially discriminatory but charged that the legislature knew the classification would
result in a disparate racial impact. Accordingly, the defendants argued that the statute should be subject to a strict scrutiny standard of
review. 153 Finding no intent to draw a suspect classification, the trial
exacting procedural requirements for litigation with sellers of 3.2 beer than sellers of
stronger liquor violated state guarantee of equal protection); Guilliams v. Commissioner of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. 1980) (holding that classification of persons under farm loss modification law does not violate state guarantee to equal
protection); Miller Brewing Co., 284 N.W.2d 353 (holding that statutory classification
permitting tax credit to producers of malt beverage with facilities in state yet denying
credit to producers without facility in state did not violate state guarantee of equal
protection); Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318 (1973) (denying
compensation benefits to family of beneficiary who committed suicide did not violate
state guarantee of equal protection).
147. See, e.g., Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 668 (1981).
148. See McGuire, 346 N.W.2d 605; Wegan, 309 N.W.2d 273; Guilliams, 299 N.W.2d
138; Schwartz, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318; Loew, 226 Minn. 485, 33 N.W.2d 598.
149. See, e.g., In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 770 n.2 (Minn. 1986);
AFSCME v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 570 n. 12 (Minn. 1983).
150. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
151. Id. at 891. MINN. STAT. § 152.023, subd. 2, provides, in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the third degree if:
(1) the person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures of a total
weight of three grams or more containing cocaine base;
(2) the person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures of a total
weight of ten grams or more containing a narcotic drug ....
152. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 887.
153. Brief for Respondents at 14, State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991)
(Nos. C3-91-92, C7-91-203).
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court applied the traditional rational basis test employed by federal
law. However, the court invalidated the statute on grounds that
there was no rational basis for the classification.154
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for
accelerated review.155 Although the court recognized that a rational
basis standard was applicable, it reasoned that the state guarantee of
equal protection imposed greater scrutiny than the federal standard. 1 56 The state standard, originating from prior judicial decisions, 157 delineated a three-pronged test requiring that:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the
classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary
or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing
a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine
or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class
and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must
158
be one that the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.

Employing this three-part test, the majority rejected, as factually unsubstantiated, three separate justifications proffered by the state for
the disparate treatment.159
Again, a forceful dissenting opinion by Justice Coyne argued that
under established equal protection standards, a statute may not be

declared unconstitutional in the absence of clear evidence of intent
to draw a suspect classification.160 She argued that proof of discrimi-

natory intent requires more than a showing that the legislature relied
on evidence that the court perceived to be factually unsubstantiated.161 Justice Coyne's dissent concluded that by circumventing the
traditional rational basis test under the guise of a less deferential
Minnesota test, the majority was effectively engaging in substantive
review of the kind rejected in Lochner v. New York, 162 and thereby substituting its political judgment for that of the legislature.163
154. Id.
155. Id.

156. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888.
157. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
158. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888 (quoting Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309
N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1980)).
159. The state argued that the classification served to target street level dealing
because, based upon state sources, three grams was the level at which dealing, not
merely personal use, took place. The state also argued that cocaine base was more
addictive and associated with greater violence than powder cocaine. Russell, 477
N.W.2d at 889-91.
160. Id. at 896.
161. Id.
162. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
163. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 902.
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ANALYSIS

The Problem with Unprincipled ConstitutionalAdjudication

Although the Friedman majority announced that "over 100 years of
precedent in Minnesota" compelled a finding that the right to counsel under the state constitution confers broader protection than the
federal right,164 it offered very little by way of textual or historical
evidence to demonstrate that the decision was grounded in the state
constitution. In the face of a state provision virtually identical to the
federal provision,165 the majority proclaimed the importance of the
right to counsel in general terms.1 6 6 Its examination of state-specific
history disclosed only one statute, which has arguably been preempted by a more recent articulation of legislative intent that is embodied in the implied consent statute.16 7 As further support for its
decision, the majority selectively drew from Minnesota case law,
overriding recent but contrary state precedent that did not facilitate
the result. 168
In Russell, the majority invalidated a statutory provision imposing
harsher penalties for possession of crack cocaine than powder cocaine on the strength of the state guarantee of equal protection.169
As evidence of this strength, the majority cited to a handful of deci164. Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Minn.
1991).
165. The federal Constitution provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. The Minnesota Constitution provides, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel in his
defense." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
166. The majority began its analysis with the assertion that the right to counsel is
a deeply entrenched principle of American jurisprudence. Friedman, 475 N.W.2d at
829. The majority then traced the historical origins of the right to counsel. Id. at
829-30. Although the right may be firmly rooted in American jurisprudence, these
general assertions do little to elucidate the importance of the right under the state
constitution.
167. As the court recognized in an earlier implied consent decision, a statute
which is later in time and more specific in scope preempts the older, more general
statute as the most accurate articulation of legislative intent. Prideaux v. Department
of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 393 (Minn. 1976).
168. The majority emphasized dicta in Prideaux which characterized the proceeding as a "critical stage." Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 832. The majority then minimized
the precedential effect of Nyflot holding that "we do not find the Nyflot analysis persuasive under our constitution." Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 832. Earlier state constitutional decisions, such as State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988), had warned
that "a more cautious judicial frame of mind is required when a court is faced with
the possibility of overruling prior decisions. We should not be quick to overrule
long-standing precedent, especially when we are construing our constitution." Id. at
380.
169. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
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sions advocating what appeared70 to be a less deferential rational
basis standard of review. 17 1 The majority bypassed contemporaneous judicial decisions which held that the state equal protection
standard was coextensive with the federal standard. 172 By invoking a
less deferential standard of review, the majority systematically rejected three separate justifications advanced by the legislature for
disparate treatment.173 Although the majority applied what they
deemed a "rational basis" standard, the analysis performed by the
court was more akin to strict scrutiny, permitting the court to reject
the legislature's reasons for disparate treatment as factually
unsubstantiated. 174
Earlier Minnesota decisions invalidating statutes by invoking state
constitutional protections were more cautious, requiring a stronger
showing of textual or historical evidence to depart from federal standards.175 These decisions were grounded in the strength of the text,
or in pre-existing bodies of state law. For example, the decisions
construing the freedom of religion clause relied on the strength of
the text, 176 and the decision construing the jury trial provision relied
on the clarity of state decisional law and legislative history suggesting enhanced historical protection.177 These decisions reflect
greater deference to the legislature by requiring a stronger showing
of textual or historical evidence to invalidate a statute by resort to
the state constitution. Friedman and Russell represent a departure
from this traditional deference to both the legislature and the court's
prior decisions.
State courts are not required to implement criteria to determine
when the history of the state warrants departure from federal consti170. As discussed above, see supra note 146, there is some question as to whether
this standard, though worded differently, amounted to the same standard of review
as that employed by federal equal protection analysis.
171. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888-89.
172. See, e.g., In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 770 n.2 (Minn. 1986);
AFSCME v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 570 n.12 (Minn. 1983).
173. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889-91 (Minn. 1991).
174. Id. at 890. A prior decision by the court advocated the view that "it is not the
role of the judiciary, in applying a rational basis standard, to question either the factual accuracy or political wisdom of the reasoning and judgments underlying legislative enactments." AFSCME, 338 N.W.2d at 570.
175. See State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 380 (Minn. 1988) (holding that duly
enacted statute is presumptively constitutional and court must proceed with great
caution and invalidate statute only if proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt).
176. See supra part III.A.
17.7. See supra part 1II.B; see also Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 153 N.W.2d
825 (Minn. 1967) (holding that state constitution confers right to trial by jury in all
criminal prosecutions, regardless of gravity); State v. Gress, 250 Minn. 337, 84
N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1957) (holding that state constitution guarantees trial by impartial jury to all persons charged with crime).
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tutional standards. Some have argued that to do so would detract
from the independence of state courts in establishing independent
bodies of state constitutional law and would create an unwarranted
presumption in favor of federal doctrine.178 They contend that requiring analytical justification to depart from established federal
standards results in unnecessary limitations that would inhibit the
free exercise of the state's sovereign power.
The concern with a principled approach is closer to home than
critics contend. A systematic approach to the state constitution is
more intimately concerned with the allocation of power within the
state than with the allocation of power between state and federal entities. Implementing interpretive criteria provides a mechanism to
ensure that constitutional review truly flows from the constitution. 179
Framed in this light, the question is not whether analytical restraints
will unnecessarily inhibit the state's sovereign power but whether
such restraints will preserve the allocation of power within the
state.180

Moreover, judicial review proceeds from the premise that a statute
178. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 959-61 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman,J., concurring)
(arguing that the judicially imposed criteria advocated by the majority and concurring opinions imposes unnecessary limitations on the power of the state court to
interpret its constitution independently); see also Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme
Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.

L. REV. 353 (1984) (arguing that the imposition of criteria reflects an implied delegation of state power to the Supreme Court).
179. As Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has argued:
[I]f a state court undertakes to evolve an independent jurisprudence under
the state constitution, it must give as much attention and respect to the different constitutional sources, and to striving for some continuity and consistency in their use, as we ask of United States Supreme Court justices in their
respective constitutional views, even when they differ among themselves.
This will not be accomplished by searching ad hoc for some plausible premise in the state constitution only when federal precedents will not support
the desired result.
Hans A. Linde, Without Due Process: UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125,
146 (1970); see also Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a
Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 975 (1979); Steven J. Twist & Len L. Munsil, The
Double Threat of JudicialActivism: Inventing New "Rights" in State Constitutions, 21 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1005 (1989); Robert F. Utter, Ensuring PrincipledDevelopment of State Constitutional Law: Responsibilitiesfor Attorneys and Courts, 1 EMERGING ISSUES STATE CONST. L.

217 (1988).
180. State legislators have expressed their dissatisfaction with the supreme court's
recent invalidations of legislative enactments. During hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee held to redraft the statute invalidated by the Russell decision, Senator
Belanger commented: "The problem I have is that it appears that the state courts
have made a questionable decision and then cloaked themselves in the state constitution ....

Clearly the courts are legislating in this area which is our prerogative."

Hearings on S.11 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 77th Leg., (Jan. 8, 1992);
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is to be declared unconstitutional only as a last resort.l 8 , The judicial doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions is premised upon
the philosophy that invalidating a statute is fundamentally inconsistent with the democratic process and should be exercised sparingly
and only when strictly necessary.1 8 2 Therefore, the judiciary should
present compelling reasons demonstrating that a statute is unconstitutional when invoking the state constitution.183 Without a principled approach for determining when the history of the state requires
a more expansive reading of the state provision, the judiciary acts as
a legislative rather than interpretive body.184
see also Donna Halvorsen, Judicial, Legislative Check, Balance; Branches Feel Some Tension,
MPLS. STAR TRIB., Feb. 9, 1992, at lB.
181. See, e.g., State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 380 (Minn. 1988) (stating that a
duly enacted statute is presumptively constitutional and the court must proceed with
great caution, invalidating the statute only if proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt).
182. As Professor Laurence Tribe has commented:
The critics start from the assumption that, in a political society which aspires
to representative democracy or at least to popular representation, exercises
of power which cannot find their justification in the ultimate consent of the
governed are difficult, if not impossible, to justify. Judicial review is thus
immediately and doubly suspect. Thejudges who declare statutes and executive actions to be unconstitutional do not acquire their positions through
popular election; once appointed, they cease to be accountable even to the
elected officials who nominated and confirmed them but rather are secured
in their independence by life tenure and guaranteed salary. Perhaps even
more significantly, judicial review is itself said to be antidemocratic since its
result is the invalidation of government action, legislative or executive-action that, however indirectly, did have the sanction of the electorate. It is
obvious, the critics argue, that if judicial review cuts against the grain of
representative democracy, judges should invoke their power to strike down
legislative and executive action only sparingly.
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 62 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted). This antidemocratic flare is perhaps mitigated by the fact that supreme court
justices are subject to the political electoral process. The Minnesota Constitution
provides that the governor "shall appoint in the manner provided by law a qualified
person to fill the vacancy until a successor is elected and qualified." MINN. CONST.
art. 6, § 8. After appointment, supreme court justices serve six-year terms and are
thereafter subject to the electoral process. MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 7. In recent history, these constitutional provisions have not been ignored. Page v. Carlson, 488
N.W.2d 274, 280 (Minn. 1992) (holding that governor may not extend ajudge's term
solely to cancel a scheduled election).
183. Constitutional review by the Minnesota Supreme Court is almost always prefaced by a recognition of this restraint. See, e.g., Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 380.
184. Another reason for judicial deference is that the state constitution was structured for easy amendment. It has been suggested that the reason for the ease with
which the constitution may be amended was an overall dissatisfaction with the document arising from the political turmoil under which the document was adopted. See
William Anderson, The Need for Constitutional Revision in Minnesota, 11 MINN. L. REV.
189, 192 (1927). The Minnesota Constitution was born amid considerable political
feuding which resulted in both the Republican and Democratic parties drafting, in
secret, their own version of the constitution. Id. Thus, an amendment procedure
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Other reasons reinforce the desirability of implementing criteria to
justify departure from federal standards. Federal law has provided
an analytical framework which has dominated constitutional adjudication for decades. Although this should not prevent a state judiciary from tailoring constitutional doctrine to meet the unique
requirements of the state, 185 it does suggest that some deference
should be accorded to federal analysis. Given the dominance of federal constitutional analysis, it is impossible to construe the state constitution in a vacuum. 18 6 Implementing criteria to depart from
federal standards enhances stability by preserving certain expectations and providing a means to predict the future of state constitutional law.
In response to these criticisms, several states have implemented
interpretive criteria to guide the court in determining when heightened state constitutional protections are warranted. These courts
have identified and applied state-specific factors that evidence the
strength of the state constitutional claim.187 Although no single factor is conclusive, certain factors are generally accorded greater
weight. The criteria guides the court in determining when the history of the state requires divergence from federal standards, and
helps ensure that the process is principled, well-reasoned and
predictable.
B.

The Alternative Approach: Criteriafor Adjudication

The decisions of a growing number of jurisdictions reflect the belief that a systematic methodology for interpreting the state constitution is necessary.188 Some jurisdictions, most notably New Jersey
and Washington, have adopted criteria to assist the court in analyzwas implemented which would permit amendment by a simple majority vote in each
house, and thereafter approved by a majority of voters at annual elections. Id.
185. The freedom of the state to experiment has been encouraged as fundamental
to federalism. In a frequently quoted dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis argued:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be frought with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
186. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964 (Handler, J. concurring) (arguing that
since "national judicial history and traditions closely wed federal and state constitutional doctrine . . . [i]t is not realistic, sound or historically accurate to regard the
separation between federal and state systems as a schism").
187. Id.
188. See State v. Hurley, 741 P.2d 257 (Ariz. 1987); Gannett Co., Inc. v. State, 571
A.2d 735 (Del. 1989); People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1990); State v. Hunt,
450 A.2d 952 (NJ. 1982); People v. PJ. Video, 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1986); State v.
Flores, 570 P.2d 965 (Or. 1977); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa.
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ing the strength of state constitutional claims. Both of these states
have well-developed bodies of state constitutional law and a strong
history of conferring broader protections under their state
constitutions. 189
In State v. Hunt,190 the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that

although sound reasons may justify departure from federal precedent, divergent interpretations that lack a reasoned basis are "unsatisfactory from the public perspective, particularly where the
historical roots and purposes of the federal and state provisions
are the same." 9 1 In Hunt, the court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment of the New Jersey Constitution prevented warrantless
seizures of an individual's long-distance billing records. The court's
examination of state history revealed a strong legislative and judicial
history
of conveying
broad protections
to telephonic
communications. 192
In a frequently cited concurring opinion, Justice Handler recognized the vitality of the state constitution as an independent source
for protecting individual liberties but noted the danger when state
courts turn uncritically to their constitutions for convenient solutions
to problems not readily available elsewhere.193 Reasoning that "it is
not entirely realistic, sound or historically accurate to regard the separation between the federal and state systems as a schism," Handler
1991); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808
(Wash. 1986).
189. For Washington cases, see Seattle v. Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1988)
(holding that use of sobriety checkpoints violate state constitutional guarantee of privacy); State v. Brayman, 751 P.2d 294 (Wash. 1988) (holding that state constitutional
guarantee of equal protection confers greater protection than federal constitution);
State v. Bartholomew, 683 P.2d 1079 (Wash. 1984) (holding that state constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment confers greater protection than
federal guarantee); State v. Chrisman, 676 P.2d 419 (Wash. 1984) (holding that state
constitution requires heightened protection for warrantless searches).
For New Jersey cases, see Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982)
(holding that state constitution requires enhanced equal protection be accorded to
individual right to health and privacy); State v. Ercolano, 397 A.2d 1062 (1979)
(holding that privacy-based freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures applied to motor vehicles); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977) (holding that
state constitution confers right of sexual privacy); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.
1976) (holding that state constitution recognizes right to terminate life-support as
aspect of right to privacy).
190. 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
191. Id. at 955.
192. In 1930 the NewJersey legislature enacted a statute making it a misdemeanor
to tap a telephone line. The statute was replaced in 1968 by a similar ban incorporated in the state Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. In addition,
state case law provided broad protection to telephonic communications. See Hunt,
450 A.2d at 955.
193. Id. at 962-63.
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articulated seven factors that he believed would serve to guide the
court in conferring heightened state constitutional protections.t94
The factors were: (1) the textual language; (2) the legislative history;
(3) the judicial history; (4) structural differences between the state
and federal constitution; (5) matters of particular state interest or
local concern; (6) state traditions; and (7) public attitudes.95 Applying these factors, Justice Handler concluded that strong legislative
and judicial histories warranted heightened protection under the
New Jersey Constitution.196
A similar approach was taken by the Washington Supreme Court
in State v. Gunwall.197 In Gunwall, the court recognized that decisions
that lack a principled approach for repudiating federal precedent
"furnish little or no rational basis for counsel to predict the future
course of state decisional law."198 The court reasoned that a methodology was necessary to ensure that recourse to the state constitution does not "spring from pure intuition, but from a process that is
at once articulable, reasonable and reasoned."199 The court argued
that criteria were also valuable to suggest to counsel where briefing
was necessary in cases urging independent state constitutional
grounds. 200
The Gunwall court articulated six factors: (1) the text; (2) significant differences in the language of parallel provisions; (3) state constitutional and common law history; (4) preexisting state law; (5)
structural differences between the state and federal constitution; and
(6) matters of particular state interest or local concern. 20 ' An examination of each factor provided evidence to support the court's con194. Id. at 964.

195. Id. at 965-66.
196. Id. at 968-69.
197. 720 P. 2d 808 (Wash. 1986).
198. Id. at 812.
199. Id. at 813 (citation omitted).
200. Id. at 813. In the subsequent decision of State v. Wethered, 755 P.2d 797,
800-01 (Wash. 1988), the court held that it will not consider state constitutional challenges where the interpretive factors articulated by Gunwall are not briefed. The
court stated, "By failing to discuss at a minimum the six criteria mentioned in
Gunwall, [the defendant] requests us to develop without benefit of argument or citation of authority the 'adequate and independent state grounds' to support his assertions." Id.
The briefing requirement responds to the problem that the court has limited
resources to exhaustively research all factors when addressing state constitutional
challenges. As Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has noted, "To make an
independent argument under the state clause takes homework-in texts, in history,
in alternative approaches to analysis. It is not enough to ask the state court to reject
a Supreme Court opinion on the comparable federal clause merely because one prefers the opposite result." Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills
of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 392 (1980).
201. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash. 1986).
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clusion that the state constitution conferred broader protection to
telephonic communications than the federal Constitution.202
The analytical approach taken by New Jersey and Washington provides a sounder basis for determining when the state constitution
confers broader protections than the federal source. Implementing
criteria ensures that the decision flows from considerations supported by the text or the history of the state, thereby preserving the
allocation of power within the state. The diversity of sources that
serve as criteria, as well as judicial discretion over how to properly
balance the criteria, allow the court a degree of flexibility in the
decisionmaking process. Minnesota should implement a similar
approach.
C.

Interpretive Criteriafor Adjudication

Numerous courts and commentators have articulated criteria for
analyzing state constitutional claims. 20 The major analytical difficulty in implementing criteria is determining what threshold showing
must be made to justify expansive interpretation. Flexibility is essential to the judicial process. Clearly, state constitutional interpretation is not a mechanical test.
Some courts appear to advocate the view that a showing of one
factor is sufficient to justify expansive treatment. 2 04 Other courts appear to suggest that the analysis is more akin to a balancing test of
20 5
factors weighing in favor of and against expansive treatment.
This Note takes the view that textual factors are sufficient to warrant
202. The court's decision was supported by five of the six factors. The text of the
Washington provision provides, "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or
his home invaded, without authority of law". Id. at 814 (emphasis in original). The
constitutional history indicated that in 1889, the state constitutional convention specifically rejected a proposal to adopt language identical to the language of the Fourth
Amendment. In addition, the court cited to several state statutes indicating broad
protection of telephonic communications. Finally, the court reasoned that whereas
the United States Constitution is a grant of limited power, the New Jersey Constitution imposes limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the state to do anything
not expressly forbidden by law. See Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 814-15.
203. See State v. Hurley, 741 P.2d 257 (Ariz. 1987); Williams v. Coppola, 549 A.2d
1092 (Conn. Super. 1986); Gannett Co., Inc. v. State, 571 A.2d 735 (Del. Super. Ct.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990); People v. Alvarez, 515 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y.
1987); State v. Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (Or. 1977); Commonwealth v. Edmunds,
586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); see also Robert F. Utter, supra note 26, at 508-24; TerrenceJ.
Fleming &Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: 'Wrapt In The Old Miasmal Mist, 7
HAMLINE L. REV. 51 (1984); Note, The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95

L. REV. 1324 (1982).
204. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 958 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
205. See Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 815. In Gunwall, the court recognized that although
the interest in national uniformity in obtaining telephone records was important, it
was outweighed by overwhelming state policy reasons to the contrary. Id.
HARV.
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heightened protections by themselves. Other factors, such as judicial or legislative treatment of the right may be sufficient by themselves if there is also a plausible showing of intent to treat the right
with heightened importance. Other, less influential factors should
be accorded less weight and balanced against more influential factors. The following delineates the most frequently cited factors.
1.

The Text

The most influential factor warranting expansive treatment is the
text. The court should draw intent from the entire document, including the preamble and applicable amendments.206 A provision
that is worded more emphatically than the parallel federal provision,
or for which there is no comparable federal provision, is strong evidence that the state drafters intended a more liberal reading of that
right. For example, under the Minnesota constitution, a more liberal
interpretation may be warranted under the freedom of religion and
conscience,207 liberty of the press,2 0 8 and jury trial provisions.209
206. The Minnesota Constitution is a very malleable document which was structured to allow great freedom in the amendment process. See supra note 184. Between
the adoption of the constitution in 1857 and the restructuring as to style and form in
1974, the document was amended over one hundred times. Therefore, consideration should be given to any amendments which may be indicative of intent to expand,
revise, or limit a particular right.
207. The Minnesota Constitution provides:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any religious or
ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference given
by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
state, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any
religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.
MINN. CoNsT. art. I, § 16. The federal Constitution provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ....
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The explicit recognition of freedom of conscience sets the state constitution
apart from the federal document. The fact that there is not a parallel provision in the
federal Constitution suggests that the drafters of the Minnesota Constitution believed the "rights of conscience" particularly worthy of protection.
208. The Minnesota Constitution provides: "The liberty of the press shall forever
remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write and publish their sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right." MINN. CONST. art. I,
§ 3. The federal Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law .. .abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, or to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend I.
209. The Minnesota Constitution provides:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases
at law without regard to the amount in controversy. A jury trial may be
waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law. The leg-
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Conversely, a state constitutional provision that is textually identical to the corresponding federal provision supplies persuasive,
though not controlling, authority for construing the provision in accordance with the federal right.210 Even in the face of a textually

identical provision, expansive treatment may be warranted upon a
showing that other interpretive factors justify heightened protection.
2.

The Drafting History

The intent of the drafters is also clear authority for construing
state provisions expansively. Unfortunately, concrete evidence of intent is often quite elusive. Although the clearest source for construing drafting intent is the wording of the provision itself, evidence can
also be drawn from the debates of the constitutional convention,
from specific events surrounding the adoption of a particular provision, or from early judicial interpretations of the right.211 For exam-

ple, the proceedings of the Minnesota Constitutional Convention212
reveal an extensive debate over the right to free speech 2 13 which may
be significant in the event of a state constitutional challenge.
3.

The State Judicial History

Judicial history suggesting expansive treatment of a constitutional
right may warrant expansive treatment of a constitutional provision.
However, appeal to state constitutional decisions that appear unsettled or appear to shift from year to year should be given less weight.
Consistent judicial interpretations of a right suggesting expansive
treatment provide strong evidence that such treatment is constitutionally required.
State constitutional law is in a state of flux after years of dormancy.
Since there are few decisions interpreting the state constitution, it is
appropriate to resort to state interpretations of federal rights which
appear to surpass minimum federal standards or which extend fedislature may provide that the agreement of five-sixths of a jury in a civil

action or proceeding, after not less than six hours deliberation, is a sufficient
verdict.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4. The federal Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury
of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .....
U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
210. See, e.g., State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. 1985) ("a decision of the
United States Supreme Court interpreting a comparable provision of the federal constitution that ... is textually identical to a provision of our constitution, is of inherently persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force").
211. For an annotation of early decisions interpreting the state constitution, see
HAROLD F. KUMM, THE CONsTrruTION OF MINNESOTA ANNOTATED (1924).
212. EARLE S. GOODRICH, THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1857).
213. Id. at 282-88.
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eral protections to state citizens prior to the federal mandate under
21
selective incorporation.

4

4.

The State Legislative History

Legislative history indicating that broad protection has traditionally been accorded a particular right may provide authority for construing a state constitutional provision expansively. For example,
Minnesota legislative history reveals a strong intent to eliminate invidious discrimination. The Human Rights Act, 21 5 enacted in 1955,
provides strong proof of such intent.
However, invoking prior legislative intent as authority to overturn
a statute is inherently problematic given that such intent is naturally
subject to change over time. Therefore, principles of statutory construction should be applied when invoking legislative intent as evidence that a statute is unconstitutional. Statutes that appear to
conflict with the challenged statute should be reconciled whenever
possible, and statutes that are more recent in time and more specific
in scope should be given more weight than older, less specific
statutes.
5.

The Attitudes of the State's Citizenry

The attitudes of the state's citizenry toward the scope or protection of a particular right has been advanced as a factor worthy of
consideration when resorting to the state constitution.216 However,
the difficulty in discerning these attitudes with any degree of accuracy should be taken into account when invoking this factor.217
214. One example can be found in the Minnesota Supreme Court's treatment of
coerced confessions. In State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15 N.W.2d 585 (1944), the
court held that a confession obtained by a murder suspect, held incommunicado after
repeated requests for her parents, attorney, doctor and priest violated the federal
guarantee of due process. The fact that Schabert was decided well before the extension of Fifth Amendment protections to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), suggests that the court perceived this right as particularly worthy of heightened protection. The United States Supreme Court has recently held that the admission of involuntary confessions is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Arizona v.
Fulminate, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991). Schabert might be one factor used to fuel a
state constitutional challenge of this practice.

215.

MINN. STAT.

§ 363.01 et seq. (1990).

216. See People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986). Other courts
have phrased this interpretive factor in terms of concerns unique to the state, a similar though not identical factor. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982);
State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986); see also Utter, supra note 26, at 521-24
(arguing that appeal to current values in construing the state constitution is necessary in order for the constitution to respond to the changing conditions of modern
life).
217. Moreover, consideration should be given to the fact that it is traditionally the
role of the legislature to interpret and respond to attitudes of the state citizenry.
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If there is demonstrable concern by the state citizenry over the retention, revision or expansion21 8 of a particular right, it is appropriate for the court to consider such expectations when interpreting the
state constitution.219 A compelling argument may be made if the
challenger demonstrates that the right is one that the state's citizenry
2 20
If
has come to expect, to rely on, or to conform its behavior to.

the court demonstrates that there is a clear expectation of protection, the court is not merely substituting its ideological views for
those of the legislature; rather it is preserving the legitimate expectations of the state's citizenry.
D. Application of Criteria:Balancing the Factors
An examination of the Friedman and Russell decisions under the alternative approach reveals the weaknesses of the state constitutional
analyses applied there. A thorough examination.of the criteria provides some evidence in favor of expansive treatment. However,
218. Presumably, if public opinion reflects an intent to expand a particular right,

the legislature will eventually respond to this desire. However, a more compelling
argument for resort to the state constitution may be made when invoking this factor
to preserve a right that has been previously conferred by the federal Constitution,
but subsequently limited or retracted.
219. A certain degree ofjudicial flexibility is essential if constitutional interpretation is to respond to modern realities. As one commentator has argued:
A process that identifies values perceived to be relevant and significant, and
from them constructs principles of a fundamental nature, does not necessarily demean the constitution or contravene democratic principles. Pretending that such review represents the constitution speaking rather than the
judiciary making it speak is less than candid and even deceitful. At the same
time, projection of a sense of constitutional meaning is unfolding from
within the document rather than being affixed to it reveals ajudiciary deeply
concerned with democratic imperatives. What eventually must be appreciated both by the Court and its detractors is that constitutional embellishment referenced to external values is legitimate, so long as the reason for it
is convincing and its citizenry immediately or eventually subscribes to it.
DONALD E. LIVELY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: ACTIVIST
WAYS AND POPULAR ENDS

65 (1990).

220. This factor could be significant in interpreting the state constitution in the
event of a privacy challenge on the issue of abortion. Public opinion polls may be
helpful in ascertaining public attitudes. According to a St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch
poll, Minnesotans approve of the current law permitting women access to abortions
during the first three months of pregnancy by a margin of 56% to 40%. Three out of
four persons believe that the decision is uniquely one for the woman to make, and six
out of ten believe the government should not interfere with personal matters such as
abortion. See Abortion Poll Finds Minnesotans Divided, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DisPATCH, Feb. 11, 1990, at IA.
This is not to suggest that resort to this factor should or can be evidenced by a
clear consensus of public opinion. Any evidence demonstrating concern over the
retention of a constitutional right is sufficient to invoke this factor for consideration.
The fact that a right was previously conferred by federal law may be evidence, in and
of itself, that state citizens have come to rely on that particular right.
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there is insufficient evidence to warrant invalidating the statute by
authority of the state constitution.
1. Right to Counsel
The Minnesota right to counsel provision is virtually identical to
the federal provision. While not controlling, the existence of a provision that is textually identical to the federal provision provides persuasive authority for treating the provisions the same. 221 Moreover,
there is no indication from the debates of the constitutional convention, or the history surrounding the adoption of the constitution,
that the framers intended a more liberal interpretation of the state
right to counsel than provided by the federal right.
Minnesota's judicial history reveals scant intent to treat the right to
counsel as deserving of any greater protection than other criminal
rights. As discussed previously,22 2 in early years, the court was generally hostile toward right to counsel challenges. With the incorporation of federal Sixth Amendment protections,223 the state right to
counsel became commensurate with the federal right. The debate
over whether the right attaches before chemical testing has resulted
in numerous challenges in recent years, however, the weight of
decisional authority favors denying rather than permitting
consultation. 2 24
There is significant state legislative history delineating the scope of
the right.225 It is significant that as early as 1887, the legislature provided a right to consult an attorney to persons restrained of their
liberty.226 However, as discussed earlier,2 2 7 if the court invokes this
factor to ascertain legislative intent as to the scope of the right, ordinary principles of statutory interpretation should apply.
It is possible to interpret Minnesota Statutes section 481.10, the
statute relied upon by the Friedman majority, consistently with the
implied consent statute. The statute requires consultation with
counsel to "a person restrained of liberty . . . upon request of the

person restrained, as soon as practicable, and before other proceedings shall be had."228 "[A]s soon as practicable" suggests that the
courts are to consider the practical consequences of immediate con221. See, e.g., State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a
decision of the Supreme Court interpreting a comparable provision is inherently persuasive though not compelling).
222. See supra part IV.A.2.
223. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
224. See supra notes 102-112 and accompanying text.
225. See MINN. STAT. ch. 481 (1990).
226. See MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1990).

227. See supra part V.C.4.
228. MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1990).
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sultation.229 Under the implied consent statute, this means the potential loss of evidence. Principles of statutory construction also
require the court to presume that the legislature did not intend an
unreasonable result.230 If "other proceedings" is interpreted to extend to all evidence-gathering procedures, then arguably every person subject to a valid search would be entitled to consult an attorney
prior to the search.231
Finally, public sentiment in Minnesota has long focused upon the
problem of drunken driving. Public opinion appears to be in favor of
harsher penalties for drunken driving232 rather than expanding criminal defendants' rights. The majority opinion recognized this concern, 23 3 but dismissed it, stating that the serious nature of the
problem does not justify "cancelling out the protection offered by
23
over 100 years of precedent in Minnesota". 4
Under the alternative analysis, there are few factors suggesting
that the history of the state favors expansive treatment of the right to
counsel. Neither the text, nor the judicial history, nor the legislative
history suggests heightened concern over the right to counsel. Nor
is there any showing that the attitudes of state citizens support expansive treatment of the right. Under this analysis, the court should
defer to the legislature.
2.

Equal Protection

Since there is no equal protection provision in the state constitution that parallels the federal provision, a meaningful comparison to
the federal provision is difficult. When there is no comparable provision, the language of the state guarantee can only be examined independently of the federal guarantee. The state right has been distilled
229. In Friedman, the state argued that allowing consultation with an attorney prior
to testing would cause delay resulting in loss of evidence, and ultimately fewer convictions. See Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 834.
230. See, e.g., Krumm v. R.A. Nadeau Co., 276 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn. 1979).
231. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Coyne made a similar observation. She
argued that permitting persons suspected of drunken driving to consult with counsel
during the investigatory stage while denying the same right to those accused of other
crimes constitutes preferential treatment. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 846.
232. See, e.g., Donna Halverson, Legislators Urged To Get Tough With First-Time
Drunken Drivers, MPLS. STAR TRIB.,Jan. 15, 1992, at 3B; Mike Kaszuba, Aggressive DWI
Cops Draw Praise, Questions, MPLS. STAR TRIB., Dec. 29, 1991, at IA. But see Chuck
Haga, 'Social Drinker' Forms Group To CounterMADD's Influence, MPLS. STAR TRIB., Jan.
27, 1992, at lB.
233. The majority in Friedman stated, "We do not disagree with the proposition
that drunk driving is a very serious social as well as legal problem. The resolution,
however, does not lie in eroding and weakening the Minnesota Bill of Rights and
resorting to the law of the Old West." Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 836.
234. Id. at 834.
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from various state constitutional provisions,235 most notably, the
privileges and immunities clause. The Minnesota provision states:
No member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any
of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by
the law of the land or the judgement of his peers. There shall be
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the state otherwise
than as punishment for a crime of which the party has been
23 6
convicted.
Examination of the text suggests that the right is dependent upon
the prevailing law and judicial process.
The constitutional history reveals that the framers actively debated
issues of racial and social equality. 2 37 The concern reflected in the
debates would be a factor weighing in favor of expansive treatment if
there were any evidence to suggest purposeful discrimination. However, the trial record in Russell revealed no evidence of any pur23 8
poseful intent to draw a suspect classification.
There is little judicial history to support the contention that the
judiciary intended a more liberal interpretation of equal protection
than is provided by federal doctrine. Although several cases reflect
some equivocation over whether the state equal protection test provided greater protection than the federal test, the weight of judicial
authority suggests that the state test is no more protective than the
23 9
federal test.
There is extensive legislative history in Minnesota designed to
eliminate purposeful discrimination. 240 However, the trial court in
Russell was unconvinced that the legislature had any intent to discriminate on the basis of race by imposing disparate penalties to
users of cocaine base.241 Conversely, the Russell decision demonstrates that the disparate penalty was intended to deter the use of
what the legislature believed to be a more addictive, more dangerous
2 2
and more destructive drug. 4
Finally, although difficult to ascertain with certainty, there is little
235. See supra notes 142-149 and accompanying text.
236. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2.
237. The delegates expressed concern that Minnesota would be a free state, and
included an amendment outlawing slavery. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2. In addition,
the delegates vigorously debated an equal suffrage provision which would have extended the right to vote to blacks. The provision was ultimately defeated. See
GEORGE W. MOORE, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA 367-82 (1858).

238. See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 900 (Coyne, J., dissenting). Moreover, if the court

had found any discriminatory intent, it could have simply invalidated the statute
under a strict scrutiny analysis.
239. See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.

240. See MINN. STAT. ch. 363 (1990).
241. See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 887.
242. Id. at 890.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992

39

1112

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 12
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18

support for the view that state citizens favor expanding criminal protections. Public opinion polls may even suggest the opposite, that
citizens would favor diminishing criminal protections to alleviate the
drug problem.243 Under this analysis, the court should also defer to
the legislature.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The state constitution will play an increasingly important role in
future years as the Minnesota Supreme Court develops an independent body of state constitutional law. The Friedman and Russell decisions illustrate the uncertainty inherent in adjudication which does
not articulate and implement a cogent methodology for interpreting
a state constitutional provision differently from a federal constitutional provision.
The political climate of federal law has dramatically changed.
There are differences of opinion as to the wisdom of recent United
States Supreme Court pronouncements, and invoking the "double
security" of the state constitution is a vital expression of the state's
independence when federal protections run dry. But the rush to the
state constitution should not result in the diminished integrity of
state constitutional law. Nor should it result in a discreet shift of
power from the legislative to the judicial branches of government.
Implementing interpretive criteria will not prevent the judiciary
from invoking the state protection when there is a compelling argument to do so. It will merely ensure that the interpretation of the
state constitution is supported by the history, attitudes and concerns
that are an integral part of our state. In reality, implementing criteria may actually enhance the likelihood that the document is expansively interpreted. Implementing an analytical framework to justify
enhanced state protection will require counsel to actively debate the
possibility of heightened constitutional protections. The court will
be presented with reasons for expansive treatment that might otherwise remain unconsidered. This debate can only enhance the integrity of our state constitutional law.
Lisa M. Wiencke
243. See Kathryn Kahler, Rampant Crime Brings Call to Curb Civil Liberties; Some Feara
Police State ifRights are Cut, MPLS. STAR TRI., Mar. 23, 1992, at 4A. The article reports that a Washington Post-ABC News Poll found that "62 percent of Americans
would be willing to give up 'afew of the freedoms we have in this country' to reduce
illegal drug activity and its attendant crime." Id.
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